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COMMENTS ON STEVEN SMITH, PAGANS 
AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY 
MICHAEL P. MORELAND† 
One of the most interesting aspects of this generally very 
interesting book was the discussion of sexual morality in 
paganism and Christianity.  I have thought for a while that much 
of the contemporary debate about religious freedom is not about 
religious freedom in a generic sense but instead about religious 
freedom in a very particular context—sex.  But that is a 
descriptive point—much more challenging is trying to give an 
account of why sex should have come to be (or as Smith’s 
argument implies, has long been) the battlefield on which much 
of the fight over religious freedom takes place.  My offhand 
thought in these remarks is that our debates about religious 
freedom would benefit from a more sustained engagement with 
this seemingly odd feature of our late modern age—that the 
fragile consensus around religious toleration in modernity has 
started to come undone over sexuality—and the deeper reasons 
for it. 
It is worth noting that this concern with sexuality (and the 
progressive opposition between religious freedom and sexual 
liberation) is a relatively recent turn in the debate over religious 
freedom, a familiar story to law and religion scholars.  Religious 
freedom during the era of the Warren and Burger Courts was 
seen as mostly a progressive cause, as witnessed by cases 
involving those seeking exemption from the draft or from 
incidental impositions on religious practice by members of small, 
minority religious groups (such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh-
Day Adventists, and the Amish).  The proponent of this 
constitutional approach to religious freedom was Justice 
Brennan, a liberal hero who combined enthusiasm for the Court’s 
decisions in Griswold and Roe amid the sexual revolution with a 
commitment to heightened protection for religious believers 
under the Free Exercise Clause.  It was often conservatives (or at 
least legal conservatives) who were most skeptical of this regime 
on religious freedom, as shown, for example, by the views of 
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Walter Berns, Justice Harlan (who dissented in Sherbert v. 
Verner), then-Justice Rehnquist, and Philip Kurland.  This was 
also a period, however, in which the debate over religious 
freedom was, broadly speaking, less contested than it is now.  
The most vocal critics of the Warren and Burger Courts focused 
their energy for the most part on abortion, criminal procedure, 
and race.  That period of mild contestation over religious freedom 
culminated in Employment Division v. Smith, where Justice 
Scalia drew an end to the era of liberal constitutional religious 
freedom in a case involving a claimed religious exemption for 
drug use (more precisely a religious exemption from the denial of 
unemployment benefits for employees dismissed for drug use), 
seen at the time as a victory for legal conservatism. 
So what changed and why did things change?  Smith’s 
answer to this normative question proceeds mostly historically, 
and I am wondering how the argument might be pressed more 
philosophically or theologically.  In The Triumph of the 
Therapeutic, Phillip Rieff called attention to a link between 
sexual morality and Christian identity: 
Historically, the rejection of sexual individualism (which 
divorces pleasure and procreation) was the consensual matrix of 
Christian culture.  It was never the last line drawn.  On the 
contrary, beyond that first restriction there were drawn others, 
establishing the Christian corporate identity within which the 
individual was to organize the range of his experience.  
Individuality was hedged round by the discipline of sexuality, 
challenging those rapidly fluctuating imperatives established in 
Rome’s remissive culture, from which a new order of 
deprivations was intended to release the faithful Christian 
believer.1 
This account—that pagan Rome celebrated sexual gratification 
and gave license to all manner of sexual expression (and 
oppression)—is echoed in Smith’s book as well.  I think there is 
also a set of arguments Christians might make as to why this is 
so, and why Christian morality includes a great deal of teaching 
on sexuality (arguments that Smith sometimes gestures toward 
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Christian sexual morality includes claims about divine 
authority and sanction, a view that runs contrary to a view 
placing autonomy and self-expression at the center.  Sexual 
morality is tied up with theological claims about the authority of 
the Bible, creation, and the significance of reproduction.  Sexual 
sin in Christianity is viewed as disordered desire and an 
inordinate love of self generated by pride.  In the Confessions 
(and I am focusing most especially here on Book II), Augustine 
tries to give an account of his own disintegration, his own 
(perverted) love for incoherence as he reflects on his sexual 
concupiscence.  In the Augustinian view, sexual desire itself is 
mediated by culture—what kinds of sexual desire are permissible 
to entertain, and what forms of sexuality are encouraged or 
prohibited. 
Traditional Christian views on sexuality pose challenges to 
the modern pagan (to use Smith’s parlance) on at least two 
fronts.  First, traditional Christian accounts hold to a view 
affirming a natural differentiation of the sexes and the biological 
significance of gender, with profound implications for gender 
equality and sex.  As argued at length by Alexander Pruss in his 
book on Christian sexual ethics, the theological commitments 
(particularly the doctrine of creation) of Christianity entail the 
significance of nature and natural desire: “A natural biological 
striving in a human being is always valuable in itself (though it 
may be contextually inappropriate), since it is the normal 
functioning of a creature made in the image and likeness of 
God.”2  But is it only in a theologically informed view that affirms 
the significance of creation in the first place that these views can 
get a hearing? 
Second, churches are among the most well-organized and 
persistent opponents of permissive views on a range of matters 
related to sex and reproduction, with abortion, contraception, 
access to artificial reproduction, and same-sex marriage being 
the most obvious examples.  In such a climate, the secular debate 
over sexual morality inevitably has come to shape our 
understanding of religion itself.  In the self-understanding of 
most orthodox Christian churches, the central doctrines are 
revelation and redemption and the primary activity is worship.  
In the secular (or Smithian “pagan”) perspective, though, moral 
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teaching—with all of its taboos and purportedly bigoted 
restrictions—is at the center of religion, with worship merely an 
activity engaged in by those who choose to do so.  The 
contemporary debate over religious freedom, then, distorts 
Christianity itself because this debate over these moral questions 
is already such a prominent feature of public life, and the church 
becomes another site of such debate.  The debate frequently 
becomes a distraction of a kind and churches come to be 
understood—both by those inside and outside of them—as little 
more than advocacy organizations in the culture wars. 
Because both sides in the discussion are sometimes at pains 
not to address the substantive questions of sexual morality (in 
part because it has become increasingly difficult even to imagine, 
let alone garner public acceptance for, arguments that are 
restrictive of sexual liberty), the discussion of religious freedom 
(and legal doctrinal twists about compelling state interests, 
narrow tailoring, third-party harms, and the like) comes to be a 
substitute for those questions.  Participants in these debates 
really disagree about questions of sexual morality, but they flee 
to a safer (in a sense) and legalistic debate over the First 
Amendment and RFRA (with echoes here of Smith’s more 
general point about law that he made in Law’s Quandary).  One 
of the many virtues of Smith’s provocative book is that it asks us 
to wonder what those legal debates are really about, including 
the odd but enduring centrality of sexuality to them. 
 
